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ew Keynesian macroeconomic models
have become workhorses for monetary
policy analysis by academic economists
and central banks.1 The latest generation
of forecasting models being developed by many central
banks consists of elaborate New Keynesian models,
whose distinguishing feature is the introduction of
nominal rigidities via monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms and/or households that set optimal prices and/
or wages at infrequent intervals.2 The incorporation of
nominal rigidities constitutes a link with the old Key-
nesian models that were prevalent until the 1970s.
Because their behavioural equations are based on
explicit maximization problems solved by households
and ﬁrms, they incorporate the main features of the
new classical and real business cycle models devel-
oped since. New Keynesian models introduce three
channels through which inﬂation is costly and which
are absent from the traditional literature on the costs
of inﬂation:
1. Since ﬁrms set prices at different times,
there is price dispersion across ﬁrms. This
price dispersion increases at higher rates of
trend inflation and entails a loss of efficiency
in production.3
1.  We brieﬂy outline a standard New Keynesian model on pp. 7–8. Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (1999) contains a good summary of the standard New
Keynesian framework.
2. Monopolistic competition refers to a particular way of modelling imperfect
competition among sellers in a market. It assumes that sellers face negatively
sloped demand curves for their product and take this into account when set-
ting their prices, while taking as given not only the price set by other ﬁrms,
but also total industry output and the exact price index for industry output.
Monopolistic competition is a paradigm that facilitates the modelling of the
effects of imperfect competition, since it abstracts completely from strategic
interaction among ﬁrms. The analytical tractability of the paradigm was
demonstrated by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
3.  The traditional literature on the costs of inﬂation addresses the issue of
price dispersion, but in a context of imperfect information in which consum-
ers expend time and energy to seek out products that are relatively less costly.
In New Keynesian models, price dispersion is costly even if there is perfect
information about the prices charged by different ﬁrms.
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2. Since ﬁrms set prices under monopolistic
competition, their prices are higher than
their marginal costs of production. The rate
of trend inﬂation has an effect on the aver-
age markup set by ﬁrms, and therefore on
the size of the distortion that results from
monopoly power, which constitutes an
additional source of inefﬁciency.4
3. At higher levels of trend inflation, firms’
pricing decisions are relatively less sensitive
to their marginal costs. Monetary policy acts
via its effects on aggregate demand, which
in turn is related to firms’ real marginal
costs. Therefore, monetary policy becomes
less effective at higher rates of inflation. This
leads to a higher variability of inﬂation,
which is also costly.
With the adoption of explicit inﬂation targeting by
more and more central banks, New Keynesian models
are being used to refine inflation targets and to
develop strategies for reducing inflation variability.
It is therefore crucially important to understand how
these new channels operate and their quantitative sig-
niﬁcance for the costs of inﬂation. This article reviews
the three new channels, explains how they operate,
discusses their quantitative importance, and exam-
ines their implications for the conduct of monetary
policy.
It is crucially important to
understand how these new channels
operate and their quantitative
signiﬁcance for the costs of inﬂation.
The article is structured as follows. The next section
very brieﬂy reviews the traditional literature on the
costs of inflation. The third section briefly presents
a simpliﬁed version of a standard New Keynesian
model. The fourth section explains in detail the work-
ings of the three new channels and discusses their
quantitative importance. The ﬁfth section discusses
the implications of these new channels for the conduct
of monetary policy.
4.  The same argument is applicable to nominal wage rigidity. The nominal
wage that gives the same average markup over the opportunity cost of leisure
will vary directly with trend inﬂation.
The Traditional Literature on the
Costs of Inﬂation
There is a voluminous literature on the costs of inﬂa-
tion. It would not be fruitful to survey this literature
in detail here, but a quick review will highlight the
absence from the traditional literature of the channels
introduced by New Keynesian models. A comprehen-
sive summary is available in Fischer and Modigliani
(1978).5 They enumerate six types of costs, starting
with an economy in which inflation is fully anticipated
and where the institutional structure of the economy
has fully adapted to inﬂation. They then gradually
relax these assumptions to discuss costs that result
from imperfectly anticipated inﬂation and from the
incomplete adaptation of institutional structures to
the presence of inﬂation.
The six costs are:
1. In a fully indexed economy in which all
agents have adapted to inflation and all
contracts and debt instruments (except
for currency) are indexed, inflation is costly
because it reduces the use of real balances,
which affects “shoe leather costs.” In addi-
tion, by altering the allocation of real wealth,
inflation may affect capital accumulation
and growth. Finally, if the unit of account
for transactions is nominal, there will be
resource costs of changing prices (“menu
costs”).6
2. In an economy in which the tax system is
less than fully indexed, inﬂation creates
distortions by affecting relative real after-
tax rates of return.
3. In an economy in which private contracts
and debt instruments are not fully indexed,
inﬂation again creates distortions by affect-
ing relative real rates of return.
4. In an economy in which inﬂation is not
perfectly anticipated, shocks to inﬂation
will cause ex ante rates of return to diverge
from ex post rates of return and will in gen-
5.  The more recent survey by Fischer (1994) should sufﬁce to show that little
was added to our knowledge of the costs of inﬂation between the publication
of the article by Fischer and Modigliani and the advent of the New Keynesian
approach to macroeconomic modelling.
6. Shoe leather costs refers to the costs in time and resources (including wear
and tear on shoes) of walking to the bank to make cash withdrawals. Menu
costs in its narrow sense refers to the costs of printing new menus with
revised prices, and more generally, to the costs of printing new catalogues,
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eral affect the distribution of income and
wealth across individuals.
5. In an economy with uncertain inﬂation,
inﬂation changes the risk characteristics of
assets and affects the allocation of wealth.
6. Finally, attempts by governments to sup-
press the symptoms of inﬂation via wage
and price controls or controls on nominal
interest rates can create additional distortions.
Fischer and Modigliani mention very brieﬂy the costs
of inﬂation through distortions in relative prices when
prices are ﬁxed at different times by ﬁrms. Their dis-
cussion focuses on the effects of unanticipated inﬂation
and the role of imperfect information: “such increased
variability [in relative prices] leads to misallocation of
resources, and to the absorption of resources in search
and information gathering activities” (1978, 828). As
discussed below, the cost of price dispersion in New
Keynesian models arises even with perfect certainty
and under perfect information. Fischer and
Modigliani do not mention the possibility of a markup
distortion. They do discuss the Phillips curve, but not
the possibility that its slope may change at different
rates of trend inﬂation.
The New Keynesian Framework
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) present a compact
version of the standard New Keynesian model, which
embodies nominal price rigidity only. Wages are
flexible, and the labour market clears at all times:
Extending the model to include nominal wage rigidity
is straightforward, but leads to a more complicated
system of equations.
The basic model supposes the existence of a collection
of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that produce
goods that are imperfect substitutes for the goods
produced by their competitors. In most versions of the
basic model, the goods are intermediate inputs that
are used by a competitive sector that produces a single
ﬁnal good.7 The ﬁrms set their prices optimally for
more than one period at a time.8 In setting their prices,
7.  Another version of the basic model makes the assumption that the goods
are imperfect substitutes from the point of view of consumers who have a
taste for diversity. The two different versions of the model are algebraically
equivalent.
8. In the standard New Keynesian model, the reason why ﬁrms set prices for
more than one period is not made explicit. This assumption is justiﬁed by
appealing to menu costs of changing prices or costs of gathering the informa-
tion necessary to make an informed decision concerning the ﬁrm’s output
price, but these costs are most often not an explicit part of the model. The
state-dependent pricing models discussed below are exceptions to this rule.
In these models, the menu costs of changing prices are modelled explicitly.
ﬁrms take into account their costs of production and
the expected future path of prices over the horizon for
which they ﬁx their prices.
This basic set-up can be used, given some additional
assumptions, to derive the so-called New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC), relating current inﬂation to
future expected inﬂation and to the output gap. In the
notation of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, we have:
. (1)
The notation used is as follows: is the deviation of
inflation from its long-run level; is the output gap, the
proportional divergence between the current level of
output and the level that would prevail if prices
were perfectly ﬂexible. is the expectations operator
conditional on information available at time t.  is a
disturbance term that is tacked onto the equation (its
presence cannot be directly inferred from the optimal
price-setting behaviour of ﬁrms) and has the interpre-
tation of a cost-push shock (something that generates
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation independently of ﬂuctuations
in the output gap).  is a parameter that measures
individuals’ subjective discount rates (which also
measures the weight they give as shareholders to
firms’ future profits versus current profits). is a
positive parameter that depends on the characteristics
of ﬁrms’ production functions, the degree of substitut-
ability across different types of goods, the frequency at
which ﬁrms change their prices, and on .
The additional assumptions needed to derive an
NKPC of this form include the following:
• Firms have a constant probability of being
able to revise their prices in any given
period. Therefore, when a ﬁrm sets its
price, it does not know with certainty for
how long the price will remain ﬁxed. This
assumption, ﬁrst used by Calvo (1983),
facilitates aggregation across ﬁrms and
leads to the simple functional form of the
NKPC.9
• Either the long-run trend rate of inﬂation is
equal to zero, or (following Yun 1996), in
periods when ﬁrms do not reoptimize their
prices, they can nevertheless adjust their
prices at a rate determined by trend inﬂa-
tion. Once again, this assumption is respon-
9. Another widely used pricing scheme is that of Taylor (1980). Under Taylor
pricing, ﬁrms keep their prices constant for a ﬁxed number of periods. It is
usually assumed that different cohorts of ﬁrms change their prices in stag-
gered fashion.
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The Costs of Inﬂation in New
Keynesian Models
Inﬂation and relative wage and price
dispersion
By considering the pricing behaviour of ﬁrms in long-
run equilibrium, it is possible to show that there is a
negative trade-off between average (trend) inﬂation
and output in New Keynesian macroeconomic mod-
els.13 (Note that this argument concerns the properties
of the long-run equilibrium itself rather than the
properties of linearizations around it.)The ﬁrstauthor
to demonstrate this result was Ascari (2004).14
The reasoning that leads to this negative trade-off is
as follows. If ﬁrms ﬁx their prices for several periods,
their relative prices will decline over time if trend
inﬂation is positive. Firms will front-end load their
prices so that they are initially higher than the overall
price level and are on average lower than the overall
price level when ﬁrms are allowed to reoptimize their
prices. Firms will produce less of their good than is
socially optimal when they first set their prices, and
as inﬂation erodes their relative prices, will wind up
producing too much of their goods. If a social planner
could allocate resources, he or she would equalize the
marginal productivity of each type of good produced
by the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Because of
pricerigidity,thistypeofequalizationdoesnothappen.
The marginal social product of ﬁrms with relatively
high prices is too high. The marginal social product
of ﬁrms with relatively low prices is too low.
This price dispersion occurs under positive trend
inﬂation even in the absence of aggregate uncertainty:
13.  Equation (1) shows that, for a given value of expected future inﬂation,
there is a positive trade-off in the short run. By dropping time subscripts and
solving for the relationship between inﬂation and output, the long-run trade-
off also appears to be positive, and authors such as Devereux and Yetman
(2002) and Blanchard and Galí (2005) have made this claim. Since the equa-
tion is based on a linear approximation, however, and variables are measured
as deviations from their long-run values, the latter are, by construction, equal
to zero in the long run. The equation should not be used to infer anything
about the long-run trade-off in isolation from the rest of the model.
14.  Buiter (2006, 2007) argues that any model in which there is a long-run
trade-off between inﬂation and output, either positive or negative, is not well
speciﬁed. He argues that the Lucas (1976) critique implies that an inﬂationary
environment would lead ﬁrms to index their prices using rules similar to the
one proposed by Yun (1996). This ﬂies in the face of casual evidence that ﬁrms
in inﬂationary environments do in fact ﬁx their prices for long periods of time
without indexing them to trend inﬂation. It also ignores the resource costs to
ﬁrms of implementing the price changes implied by their indexation rules.
State-dependent pricing models such as that of Dotsey, King, and Wolman
(1999), in which the costs of changing prices are modelled explicitly and the
average length of price rigidity is endogenous, are immune to the Lucas cri-
tique, but do not prejudge the issue of whether price dispersion varies with
trend inﬂation in the steady state.
sible for the simple functional form of the
Phillips curve.
• The NKPC is derived by aggregating the
optimal price-setting decisions across ﬁrms
and then taking a ﬁrst-order approximation
of the resulting equation around the trend
rate of inﬂation, which must be zero unless
the Yun (1996) assumption is used.
• The aggregate capital stock is ﬁxed in the
short run, but capital can be reallocated
instantaneously and costlessly across dif-
ferent ﬁrms.
Much of the discussion of the costs of inﬂation and of
the implications of New Keynesian macroeconomics
for monetary policy has taken this simple form of the
NKPC for granted. This can be quite misleading, as
we will argue below.
The New Keynesian model is completed by a dynamic
IS curve:10
, (2)
where  is a short-term nominal interest rate (meas-
ured as the deviation from its long-run level), and
is an aggregate demand disturbance. This equation
can be derived from the consumption Euler equation
of the representative private agent after imposing the
condition that consumption equals output minus gov-
ernment spending.11
An interest rate reaction function for the central bank
can be added, assuming that the monetary policy
instrument is the short-term interest rate, in which
case we have a three-equation system for the three
endogenous variables , , and . Alternatively, it
is possible to derive the optimal monetary policy by
deﬁning a loss function that depends on inﬂation and
the output gap and by minimizing the loss function
subject to the NKPC.12
10.  The IS curve is the relationship, in standard Keynesian models, between
the interest rate and output that yields equilibrium in the goods market.
11.  The Euler equation comes from the household’s ﬁrst-order condition for
asset holdings, which yields an equation relating current consumption and
expected future consumption. The basic model abstracts from investment and
assumes a closed economy.
12.  Woodford (2003) shows how to derive such a loss function as an approxi-
mation of the utility function of the representative agent. In solving the prob-
lem, the central bank is assumed to be able to choose the inﬂation rate and the
output gap subject to the NKPC. The interest rate that will allow these targets
to be achieved can then be backed out using equation (2).
xt j i ( t Etpt 1 + ) – Etxt 1 + gt ++ – =
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firms that have set their prices more recently have
higher relative prices (and lower output) than firms
that have not had a chance to reoptimize their prices
for a longer period. Furthermore, the degree of front-
end loading of prices is an increasing function of the
trend rate of inflation. The steady-state spread between
the ﬁrm with the highest relative price and the ﬁrm
with the lowest relative price increases with the rate
of trend inflation. Price dispersion is therefore an
increasing function of trend inﬂation, and real gross
domestic product (GDP) is a decreasing function of
steady-state inﬂation. These results hold qualitatively,
not only for Calvo pricing, but for any pricing scheme
that has the property that average contract length is
independent of the trend rate of inﬂation. The size of
the effect of trend inﬂation on output is highly sensi-
tive to the type of pricing scheme that is assumed.
We take up this issue in the next subsection.
Price dispersion is an increasing
function of trend inﬂation and causes
real GDP to be a decreasing function
of steady-state inﬂation.
The quantitative importance of price dispersion
The quantitative importance of this cost depends
critically on assumptions concerning the type of wage-
and price-setting. Ascari (2004) calibrates a standard
new Keynesian model with realistic numerical values
for its structural parameters. He shows that, under
Calvo pricing, even moderate inflation has very
strong effects on the steady-state level of output
because of the assumption that all ﬁrms have a proba-
bility of being able to revise their price no matter how
long it has been in effect. This means that there will be
a small number of ﬁrms that have not revised their
price for a very long time. Their relative prices are so
low that they capture a large fraction of the total mar-
ket. Ascari shows that with moderately high trend
inflation (on the order of 15 per cent to 20 per cent
inﬂation at annual rates, depending on the elasticity
of substitution across different types of goods),
steady-state output falls to zero, and there is no well-
deﬁned equilibrium. The relative price of the small
number of ﬁrms that have not changed their price in a
long time is so low that they capture all of aggregate
demand, leaving nothing for the other ﬁrms in the
economy.
Under Taylor pricing, the quantitative effects of price
dispersion are smaller by an order of magnitude than
under Calvo pricing. Taylor pricing holds that ﬁrms
keep their prices constant for a fixed, rather than a
random, number of periods. With positive trend
inﬂation, the ﬁrms with the lowest relative prices have
not changed their prices for the number of periods
equal to one less than the average length of the price
contract (which is the same for all ﬁrms). Under Calvo
pricing, the ﬁrms with the lowest relative prices have
kept their prices constant for an indefinitely long
period of time, even if the average number of periods
between price changes is relatively low.
Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2006) extend Ascari’s
result to look at the effects of trend inﬂation outside
the steady state. Since stochastic shocks can affect the
dispersion of prices outside the deterministic steady
state, it is necessary to use higher-order approxima-
tions of the model’s equilibrium conditions in order to
capture these effects: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005)
show that a linearized model such as the basic New
Keynesian model will, by construction, be unable to
capture the effect of shocks on wage and price disper-
sion. Amano, Ambler, and Rebei ﬁnd that Ascari’s
results (2004) are amplified outside of the deterministic
steady state. Under Calvo pricing, stochastic shocks
have quantitatively very large effects on price disper-
sion, and these effects increase with the rate of trend
inﬂation. Under Taylor pricing, the effects are quanti-
tatively very small.
The quantitative difference for price dispersion between
Calvo pricing and Taylor pricing has important conse-
quences for the welfare costs of trend inﬂation. Under
both pricing schemes, trend inflation reduces economic
welfare because of the loss of output, but the costs of
trend inﬂation are extremely high under Calvo pricing
and very mild with Taylor pricing. The quantitative
impact of trend inflation under Calvo pricing is so
high that Ascari (2004) and Amano, Ambler, and
Rebei (2006) question the usefulness of this pricing
scheme. New Keynesian models with Taylor pricing
and Calvo pricing may bracket the true cost of
inﬂation resulting from price dispersion,15 indicating
a need for empirical work to better assess the true cost
of price dispersion. Researchers will first have to identify
plausible empirical equivalents for the rather abstract
15. Furthermore, if the average duration of price rigidity actually decreases at
higher levels of inﬂation, the costs of inﬂation resulting from price dispersion
could be even lower. In models where the degree of price rigidity depends on
the average rate of inﬂation, it would also be necessary to take account of the
resource costs of changing prices to get a complete measure of the welfare
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intermediate goods that are used in the models.
While the effects of price dispersion under Taylor
pricing are quantitatively very small, Amano et al.
(2007) show that even with Taylor contracts, nominal
wage rigidity can have quantitatively important effects
on economic welfare. This result is compatible with
Huang and Liu (2002), who show that rigid nominal
wages lead to a higher degree of persistence in New
Keynesian models than rigid nominal prices, and with
Ambler (2006), who shows that it is easier to justify
nominal wage rigidities as an equilibrium outcome in
the face of small adjustment costs than it is to justify
nominal price rigidities.
Finally, state-dependent pricing models such as those
analyzed by Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and
Golosov and Lucas (2003) have the property that the
average length of price rigidity reacts endogenously
to changes in trend inﬂation.16 The dynamics of price
dispersion have not yet been analyzed in this type of
model, but this is a potentially fruitful avenue for
future research.17
Effects of trend inﬂation on markups
The monopolistically competitive firms in New
Keynesian models face downward-sloping demand
curvesfortheirproducts.Themostcommonassumption
is that their demand curves have a constant elasticity
of demand. If they were able to reset their prices in
each period, proﬁt maximization would entail a
proportionally constant markup over their marginal
costs. Since they ﬁx their prices for several periods,
their markup will vary from period to period during
the price contract. With positive trend inﬂation, the
markup will be eroded over time.
With ﬂexible prices, monetary policy has no leverage
over the markup. If nominal prices are rigid, the average
markup will depend on trend inﬂation. The reasons
for this are not obvious. Wolman (2001) distinguishes
betweentwoeffectsofinflationontheaveragemarkup.
First, higher inﬂation leads ﬁrms that do adjust their
prices to set a higher markup in order to protect them-
selves against the erosion of their relative prices from
future inﬂation. Second, higher inﬂation accelerates
the rate of erosion of the markup of firms whose prices
remain fixed. Wolman refers to this latter effect as
the erosion effect. He shows that, in a simple model
with two-period price rigidity, the erosion effect
16.  Bakhshi, Khan, and Rudolf (2004) show how to derive a Phillips curve
based on a model of state-dependent pricing.
17.  Golosov and Lucas (2003) show that steady-state price dispersion is
affected, but not strongly, by trend inﬂation (see their Figure 3).
dominates at very low levels of inﬂation, so that rising
inflation decreases the average markup. At higher
levels of inflation, the former effect dominates. Wolman
also shows that a low, positive inflation rate minimizes
the average markup in the steady state.
The average markup is directly
related to trend inﬂation.
Another way of looking at this problem is as follows.
Costs are typically convex in output. At higher rates
of trend inﬂation, an individual ﬁrm’s relative price
varies more over the life of the contract. When it resets
its price, the ﬁrm front-end loads the price. The ﬁrm’s
relative price is high initially, and therefore its output
(which is determined by the demand for its product)
is low. Over time, inﬂation erodes the relative price,
which is typically below average just before the price
is reset. The ﬁrm’s output increases over the life of the
price contract, and its marginal cost increases more
than proportionally. In order to achieve the same aver-
age markup above marginal cost over the life of its
price contract, the ﬁrm must initially set a higher rela-
tive price. Aside from a region for very low positive
values of trend inﬂation where the erosion effect dom-
inates, the average markup is directly related to trend
inflation.
The quantitative importance of variable markups
The inflation rate at which the average markup is
minimizeddependsonallofthestructuralparameters
of the model, including the elasticity of substitution
across different types of goods and the average length
of the nominal price rigidity. In general, the markup-
minimizing inflation rate is low, and the minimum
average markup is not much lower than with a zero
rate of trend inﬂation. With low to moderate rates of
trend inﬂation, the average markup does not vary by
much. Economic welfare is therefore not too sensitive
to the rate of trend inflation over this range when
looking only at the markup channel.
Inﬂation and the slope of the Phillips curve
As discussed above, the standard NKPC is derived
under the restrictive assumption that either trend
inflation is zero or firms adjust their prices at a rate
equal to trend inflation even during periods when
they are not allowed to reoptimize their prices. If the
prices of all ﬁrms increase at the rate of trend inﬂation,11 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
the slope of the Phillips curve is independent of trend
inﬂation.
The assumption can be relaxed by assuming that ﬁrms
are not allowed to adjust their prices during periods
when they are not allowed to optimize their prices,
and by dropping the assumption that trend inﬂation is
zero. Under Calvo pricing, it is still possible to derive
a fairly simple Phillips curve by aggregating across
ﬁrms and linearizing around a given (non-zero) rate of
trend inﬂation. This extended New Keynesian Phillips




Here,  is deﬁned as the deviation of inﬂation from
trend inﬂation, which is given by . The slope of the
Phillips curve, which is given by , now depends
on the rate of trend inﬂation. The structural parame-
ters on which depends include , which gives the
constant probability that an individual ﬁrm will not
be allowed to revise its price during a given period,
and , which gives the elasticity of substitution across
the different goods produced by the monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms.
Several points are worth noting about the ENKPC.
First, we can recover the standard NKPC by setting
 = 1 (i.e., by assuming zero trend inﬂation). Second,
the level of the inﬂation target alters the relationship
between inflation and output, thereby altering the
dynamics of inflation. Specifically, the output gap
parameter is decreasing in , so a decline in the central
bank’s inﬂation objective strengthens the link between
inﬂation and the output gap. In other words, with a
lower (higher) inflation objective the current output
gap has to vary less (more) to achieve a given change
in inﬂation, all else being equal.19 In this sense, mone-
tary policy is more effective at lower levels of trend
inflation. Not only is there an inverse relationship
between trend inﬂation and the output gap parameter,
there is also a direct relationship between trend inﬂa-
18.  Detailed derivations of the ENKPC can be found in Ascari and Ropele
(2006) and Bakhshi et al. (2003).
19.  It is important to note that these results hold only for moderate rates of
trend inﬂation such as those experienced in many industrialized countries
over the past three decades. As shown by Ascari (2004), at higher levels of
inﬂation, their output literally falls to zero with Calvo pricing.
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tion and the impact of expected inﬂation on current
inﬂation.
The intuition for this last result is straightforward. The
ENKPC indicates that when ﬁrms set their prices, they
pay attention to expected future inﬂation and to real
marginal cost. With low trend inflation, the most
important determinant of proﬁts is the expected evo-
lution of real marginal cost, captured by the term for
the output gap in equation (3). At higher rates of trend
inflation, the evolution of inflation has a relatively
more important impact on profits, and expected
future inﬂation gets relatively more weight in ﬁrms’
optimal pricing rule. Inﬂation becomes less sensitive
to marginal cost. The ENKPC merely says that the rel-
ative weight on real marginal costs versus expected
future inﬂation declines as trend inﬂation increases.
Insofar as real marginal cost is directly related to the
output gap, the Phillips curve becomes ﬂatter. This
means that monetary policy (which acts by affecting
aggregate demand) becomes less effective at higher
rates of inﬂation.
This result may seem counterintuitive, especially in
light of the conjecture by Taylor (1999) that the degree
of pass-through from ﬂuctuations in marginal cost to
output prices would decline with trend inﬂation. His
result can be understood in the context of ﬁxed menu
costs for changing prices. It is as if we were to endog-
enize the frequency of price changes in the basic New
Keynesian model, making it a direct function of the
rate of trend inﬂation.
Monetary policy becomes less
effective at higher rates of inﬂation.
The reduced effectiveness of monetary policy is a cost
of inﬂation. Ascari and Ropele (2006) show that,
under discretionary monetary policy, it is optimal
for the central bank to respond less strongly to varia-
tions in inflation resulting from cost-push shocks.
This can explain the empirical regularity of a direct
relation between the level and the variability of inflation.
Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2005) show that this posi-
tive relationship between the average level of inflation
andinflationvariabilityholdswhenthecentral bank can
precommit to the optimal monetary policy. Because of
the reduced effectiveness of monetary policy at higher
rates of trend inﬂation, this constitutes an additional
cost of trend inﬂation in terms of economic welfare.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
Implications for Monetary Policy
The three channels through which inﬂation is costly
have implications both for monetary policy in the long
run (the choice of the steady-state level of inﬂation),
and for the conduct of short-run stabilization policy
(the optimal degree of price-level stability).
Optimal trend inﬂation in New Keynesian
models
Price dispersion is minimized in the steady state when
trend inflation is equal to zero. The costs resulting
from the markup distortion are minimized at a low,
positive rate of inﬂation. When choosing an optimal
rate of trend inflation, the costs of these two distortions
would have to be balanced at the margin. In a simple
model with two-period price rigidity, Wolman (2001)
shows that the price-dispersion distortion is quantita-
tively much more important, so that the optimal rate
of trend inﬂation is very close to zero.
With nominal wage rigidities, a trend rate of wage
inﬂation of zero would minimize welfare costs owing
to wage dispersion, while a slightly positive rate of
wage inflation would minimize the average markup
of nominal wages over the opportunity cost of for-
gone leisure. With both nominal wage and nominal
price rigidities, the costs of all four distortions in the
steady state (price dispersion, wage dispersion, the
average markup of prices over marginal costs, and the
average markup of wages over the opportunity cost of
leisure) would have to be balanced at the margin. If
the trend rate of wage inflation equals the trend rate
of price inflation, which must be the case in the
absence of technological progress, this would once
again give an optimal trend inﬂation rate very close to
zero.
If the trend rate of technological progress is positive,
the trend rates of wage and price inﬂation would have
to differ so that real wages could grow along the econ-
omy’s balanced growth path. The work of Amano et
al. (2007) and of Ambler and Entekhabi (2006) suggests
that the most costly distortion is the one resulting
from wage dispersion. Balancing the costs of the two
dispersion distortions and the two markup distortions
at the margin would lead to an optimal trend rate of
wage inﬂation very close to zero. Consequently, the
optimal rate of price inﬂation would be negative.
Amano et al. (2007) show that because of the non-
linearities inherent in the New Keynesian model, the
introduction of technical progress increases the benefits
of lowering the trend rate of price inﬂation towards
zero.
The ﬂattening of the Phillips curve at higher rates of
trend inﬂation would also favour a trend inﬂation rate
of zero in order to maximize the efﬁcacy of monetary
policy. Obviously, when the three channels introduced
by New Keynesian models are combined with tradi-
tional channels, the optimal trend inﬂation rate will
balance all of the costs and benefits at the margin.
For example, the inability to pay interest on outside
money balances will push the optimal trend inﬂation
rate towards that implied by the Friedman rule.20
Optimal stabilization policy
Stochastic shocks have the effect of causing ﬂuc-
tuations in price and wage dispersion and in aver-
age markup. A central question in the context of
New Keynesian models concerns the optimal degree
of price-level variability. Earlier papers addressed this
question using relatively simple versions of the New
Keynesian model and concluded that price-level
stability is the optimal monetary policy. This is the
conclusion of Goodfriend and King (1997).21 In their
model, the trend inflation rate is taken as given and
is not necessarily equal to zero. Their model actually
implies that strict inﬂation targeting is optimal, so that
past inﬂation surprises are accommodated by the cen-
tral bank.
Goodfriend and King’s model assumes only nominal
price rigidity, and they characterize monetary policy
as optimal if it allows the economy to attain the same
equilibrium that it would under ﬂexible prices (even
though the ﬂexible price equilibrium is suboptimal,
owing to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms that set prices
above their marginal costs of production). In richer
settings, price stability may no longer be optimal.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) set up a model
with both nominal wage and price rigidities,22 in
which the markup distortions are corrected through
the use of ﬁscal policy. Only two distortions remain,
stemming from the two types of nominal rigidity, but
the central bank cannot achieve a Pareto-efﬁcient allo-
cation if it has only one instrument. They show that
the utility of the representative private agent can be
approximated with a loss function that depends on
variability in price and wage inﬂation and the output
20.  The Friedman rule stipulates that, for efﬁciency reasons, cash balances
should carry the same real rate of return as interest-bearing assets. This holds
when the inﬂation rate is sufﬁciently negative to reduce the nominal interest
rate on bonds to zero.
21.  Goodfriend (2002) includes a relatively non-technical summary of the
main arguments of Goodfriend and King (1997).
22.  Both wages and prices are set using Calvo contracts in their model.13 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
gap. They also show that the optimal monetary policy
involves some real wage adjustment and that between
prices and nominal wages, it is the most flexible variable
(the one with the shortest average contract length)
that optimally does the most adjusting.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) study optimal ﬁscal
andmonetarypolicyinamoreelaborateNewKeynesian
model that includes both nominal price and nominal
wage rigidities (once again wages and prices are set
using Calvo contracts) and other sources of distortion
such as distortionary taxation. Some of the features of
their model would seem to favour variable inﬂation as
the optimal monetary policy: for example, the existence
of non-indexed nominal government bonds creates an
incentive to use inflation to erode the real value of
government debt. Nevertheless, they find that the
optimalmonetarypolicyinvolvesaverylowvolatilityof
prices.23 Since wages and prices are set using Calvo
contracts, this is likely to accentuate the costs of price
dispersion both in the steady state and in response to
23.  They calculate the optimal monetary and ﬁscal policies by assuming that
the government can precommit to its announced policies and by solving for
the government’s optimal strategies subject to the ﬁrst-order conditions of
private agents.
stochastic shocks: Their results may not be robust to
the introduction of alternative pricing schemes. In
addition, they include aggregate technology shocks in
their model, but technology is stationary, so that there
is no wedge in the long run between price inflation and
wage inflation. This feature of their model is also likely
to favour price stability as the optimal monetary policy.
Conclusions
New Keynesian models have immensely enriched our
qualitative understanding of the costs of inflation.
They will be used by central banks for the foreseeable
future as forecasting tools and for analyzing the optimal
conduct of monetary policy. This article argues that
the quantitative importance of the impact of inﬂation
on economic welfare depends on how nominal price
and wage rigidities are modelled, which varies widely
across different types of New Keynesian models.
Clearly, further ﬁne-tuning of inﬂation targets and of
strategies to keep inﬂation on target in both the short
and the medium term will depend on developing a
better understanding of the new channels and of how
important they are for quantifying the costs of inflation.
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